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Global environmental policy certainly could gain strength if the management of 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) or of the UN Commission 
on Sustainable Development (CSD) were made more efficient. However, such 
a minimalist strategy of efficiency improvement is no panacea: it can only be an 
element, not the core of a new global environmental policy. 
Therefore, instead of merely calling for improved efficiency and coordination, in 
this paper a proposal is made to establish a World Environment and 
Development Organization (WEDO) as a new specialized agency of the United 
Nations. At the very least, such an Organization should integrate UNEP, the 
CSD and the relevant Convention Secretariats (climate, biodiversity, 
desertification conventions); close cooperation with the Bretton Woods 
institutions - the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) - and the existing UN specialized agencies would 
need to be ensured. 
Also, ideas are being presented on the decision-making procedures, the 
participation of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and on the financing 




3 l.    SETTING THE SCENE 
A comprehensive and systematic global environmental policy does not yet 
exist. Nonetheless, first outlines are becoming visible of a new policy arena 
which, while still fragmented, is essentially global in scope. Scenarios depicting 
possible futures have illustrated how urgent it is to act and have demonstrated 
the dangers of inaction or procrastination. If the economies of the industrialized 
countries are not ecologically restructured and if the catch-up development 
process of the countries in transition and the developing countries is not made 
resource and energy efficient, an ecological impasse for the world as a whole 
would seem inescapable. Local and national initiatives can mitigate such a 
global problematique, but only global policy approaches can really solve it. To 
protect the global environment may thus well become the chief challenge to 
face in the coming era of intensifying economic globalism. 
To date, politicians have reacted by attempting to improve coordination and 
cooperation among states: A veritable "explosion of international environ-
mental law" (Richard E. Benedick) has taken place. The volume of 
environmental agreements is indeed impressive (cf. Box 1). But have these 
agreements ever been implemented? Has the "explosion" of legal instruments 
really benefited the environment? Are governments complying with what they 
resolved at the major international environmental conferences, notably 
Stockholm in 1972, Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and New York in 1997? 
Successes have indisputably been achieved. In Europe, for instance, sulphur 
emissions have been curbed. The 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer has ensured that the production and consumption of 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in industrialized countries has practically ceased. 
The 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, by contrast, has not 
yet had the same success. Whether the 1992 Convention on Biological 
Diversity has been able to halt species decline is also in doubt. 
5  
6 In the following, we shall put forward viable proposals for improving the 
implementation of treaties and agreements. We concentrate on the system of 
institutions operating in the arena of global environmental and development 
policies, and give a general outline of how these could be reformed. 
II.    MORE EFFICIENCY AND COORDINATION WILL NOT SUFFICE 
The view is commonly voiced that the existing international organizations are too 
cumbersome, that they need to become leaner and to have more efficient 
procedures. According to this point of view, more effectiveness in global 
environmental policy does not need new and more powerful organizations, but first 
of all an "efficiency revolution" within the United Nations system. We shall not 
discuss this view in detail here. However, if we compare, for instance, the budget 
of the UN Secretariat in New York with the (larger) budget of the New York fire 
brigade, then we find that the UN is not the money-devouring hydra that the 
published opinion so frequently sees in it. Nor can the workings of a multilateral 
organization that employs staff from 180 countries according to a sophisticated 
quota system be compared to an industrial company or a state agency. 
This is not to say that global environmental policy could not gain strength if the 
management of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP, cf. Box 2) or 
of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD, cf. Box 3) were made 
more efficient. What must be kept in mind, though, is that a minimalist strategy of 
efficiency improvement is no panacea; this can only be an element, but not the 
core of a new global environmental policy. 
Improved coordination of international environment policy is another frequently 
voiced demand. The principal players have in the past included UNEP (with 
offices in Nairobi and Geneva), the CSD in New York and the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF, managed by the World Bank, UNEP and the United 
Nations Development Programme, the GEF's "implementing agencies"). Then 
there are the conferences of the parties to the Climate Convention, the 
Biodiversity Convention, the Desertification Convention, the Montreal Protocol, 
7  
 
8 to the conventions on wetlands, the protection of world cultural and natural 
heritage and the conservation of migratory wild animals and to further treaties, 
all with their own secretariats and bureaus. However, almost all of these 
institutions overlap to some degree with each other in their areas of 
competence. Where concentration takes place at all, this is on an ad-hoc 
basis, individual conferences of the parties entering into agreements 
concerning coordination and cooperation among each other or with UN 
agencies. An improved networking among the decentral conferences of the 
parties, convention secretariats and UN agencies and departments and 
among the World Bank, OECD and World Trade Organization (WTO) would 
certainly be an important step towards optimizing global environmental and 
development policies. However, without the corresponding institutional and 
financial strengthening, such improved networking will not bring about 
adequate progress on its own. As far back as the 1970s, a coordination 
committee for UN environmental policy was set up without solving the problem. 
Figure 1: A World Environment and Development Organization 
 
 
9 Instead of merely calling for improved efficiency and coordination, we therefore 
propose the establishment of a World Environment and Development 
Organization as a new specialized agency of the United Nations. At the very 
least, the World Environment and Development Organization should integrate 
UNEP, the CSD and the relevant convention secretariats. In addition, it would 
need to be examined to what extent the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), with its project budget of about one billion US dollars, 
could be integrated into the new World Environment and Development 
Organization. A further important point is that close cooperation with the 
Bretton Woods institutions - the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), and the WTO - and the existing UN specialized agencies would need to be 
ensured. 
III.   WHY WE NEED A WORLD ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 
ORGANIZATION 
In times of severe budget constraints, whoever recommends the 
establishment of a new organization is quickly stamped an idealistic reformer. 
Nonetheless, we not only consider such an organization to be realistic, but, 
moreover, view this as an opportune time to advance such a proposal. If all 
the synergisms offered by integrating existing programmes are considered, the 
costs of such a new organization would not be excessive. The integration of 
separate programmes and convention secretariats into one organization leads 
to substantial savings in terms of administrative costs - above all by grouping 
UNEP, the CSD and the convention secretariats in Montreal, Bonn, Nairobi 
and Geneva. 
As with all international organizations, the establishment of a World 
Environment and Development Organization would need to be adopted at a 
diplomatic conference, which would determine the Organization's mandate, 
budget, financing key and other procedural issues. The founding treaty would 
then need to be ratified. Not all states would have to join in, and in contrast to an 
amendment to the UN Charter the permanent members of the UN Security Council 
would not have a veto power. States with a sceptical stance to the UN 
 
10 need not join from the outset, although their membership would certainly be 
desirable. They could participate in individual projects and could later join the 
Organization at any time. 
Which functions should such a new world organization perform within the 
system of international institutions? We essentially see three core purposes: 
• a  higher  status for the tasks of global environmental and development policy 
among national governments,  international organizations and non-stats 
actors; 
•  an   improved   implementation   of   the   existing   instruments   of   global 
environmental    and    development    policy    and    improved    institutional 
arrangements at the international level, in order to place the new problems 
on the agenda and to negotiate detailed objectives and measures such as 
new conventions and protocols; and 
• a  strengthened  capacity for action on the part of states, particularly the 
poorer developing countries, through improved international cooperation 
and support. 
1.    Raising Awareness of Problems and Generating Information 
The World Environment and Development Organization should, as is the remit 
of most of the UN specialized agencies, raise awareness of problems and 
enhance worldwide information as a decision-making basis. This embraces 
both information on the "Earth system" and the present environmental and 
development problems, and information on the state of implementation of 
international and national policies for steering global change. Of course, the 
wheel need not be reinvented: All global environmental agreements already 
commit their parties to regularly report on their policies; specialized agencies 
such as the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) or the World Health Organization (WHO) collect 
and disseminate valuable knowledge and promote further research; the CSD 
makes important contributions towards developing indicators for sustainable 
development; and UNEP, not least, is active in all of these fields. 
11 However, a need remains to comprehensively coordinate and bundle this 
knowledge and to process and channel it in a decision-oriented manner. The 
many contributions currently made by the various international actors are in 
need of a central anchoring point within the system of international institutions. 
UNEP could form this anchoring point, but its resources and present 
competences are inadequate as a purely ecologically defined programme 
subsidiary to the UN General Assembly. This task would much better be 
performed by a treaty-based World Environment and Development 
Organization that is institutionally independent and has an adequate financial 
basis through additional funding. 
2.    Improving the Institutional Set-up for Implementing Sustainable 
Development 
Global environmental and development policies are implemented through 
international regimes under which the states agree to adopt common measures 
and programmes. The "world legislature" is located in the diplomatic 
conferences and the various assemblies and committees of the United Nations, 
its specialized agencies and the Bretton Woods institutions. However, there is 
a lack of linkage. For instance, there is a lack of effective coordination between 
climate and biodiversity policies. It is thus probable that the crediting of 
greenhouse gas sinks under the Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Convention will 
create incentives in forest policy that run counter to the objectives of 
biodiversity policy, because the Protocol rewards as a climate policy measure 
the logging of (species-rich) primary forests and the subsequent reafforestation 
with (species-poor, but rapidly growing) plantations. 
A further central issue is that the global environmental crisis is essentially not a 
technical problem that might be solved by sectoral policies alone: What is 
required in addition is a worldwide political strategy that promotes the guiding 
principle of sustainable development in international trade policy, in 
development cooperation and in international industrial and financial policies. 
UNEP is not in a position to pursue this, and the CSD has not had much 
success here, either. This is why the establishment of a strong World 
Environment and Development Organization could provide a new forum for 
negotiating and implementing a global strategy of sustainable development. 
12   3.      Guaranteeing Support for Developing Countries 
The 1992 "Earth Summit" in Rio explicitly recognized the principle of "common 
but differentiated responsibilities and corresponding abilities" of states in global 
environmental policy. The weak cannot carry the same load as the strong. This 
initially resulted in several of the subsequent international agreements making 
a differentiation of commitments; developing countries must do less for the 
global environment than industrialized countries. This then further leads to the 
commitment of the industrialized countries to finance the additional costs 
incurred by developing countries in protecting global environmental goods. 
Insofar as the global environment is concerned, the North has declared itself 
willing to financially and technologically support the efforts of the South. 
However, here, too, the system of international institutions has displayed an 
ad-hoc approach that has at best partially satisfied the requirements of 
transparency, effectiveness and participation of affected parties. 
 
13 Many developing countries continue to reject the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) as a central financial mechanism. One reason for this is that the GEF's 
award criteria, for instance the limitation to "global" environmental problems, 
still correspond too little to the interests of the developing countries (cf. Box 4). 
A mosaic of separate funds continue to operate beside the GEF: the 
Multilateral Ozone Fund, the funds under the conventions on the protection of 
wetlands, the protection of world heritage, the protection of the Mediterranean, 
the new "Clean Development Mechanism" of climate policy and so forth. 
The establishment of a World Environment and Development Organization 
could provide a new approach by which to coordinate the various financial 
mechanisms in order to maximize synergistic effects, and to administer in trust 
the finances of the various sectoral funds. This could integrate the functions of 
the GEF (and thus dissolve it). Such a proposal could be made acceptable to 
the industrialized countries by giving the World Environment and Development 
Organization a decision-making procedure factually corresponding to that of 
the GEF (in more detail below). 
IV.   Do WE NEED MORE FAR-REACHING APPROACHES? 
The World Environment and Development Organization proposed here should 
remain basically restricted to the three functions set out above. By contrast, a 
number of maximalist  proposals have been put forward elsewhere that go 
much further and aim at fundamental changes to the system of international 
institutions. 
1.      Supranational Environmental Agencies 
Some proposals speak of the necessity of a greater relinquishment of national 
sovereignty, for instance through a "world environment council" or an 
"environmental security council", such a council being equipped with coercive 
powers to enforce majority decisions in global environmental policy. Given the 
current state of international relations, such proposals appear rather 
14 unrealistic, for one thing because they would require an amendment to the UN 
Charter - and this can only take place with the agreement of two thirds of all 
states, including the votes of all of the permanent members of the UN Security 
Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the USA). Currently, 
the developing countries (above all China) fiercely resist any suggestion in 
international documents of a restriction to their sovereignty, nor are the 
industrialized countries (above all the USA) willing to go very far in this 
respect. 
The same problem attaches to the proposal to convert the existing UN 
Trusteeship Council, which has become obsolete after the independence of 
the UN trust territories, into a "global environmental trusteeship council". This 
idea has been put forward by, among others, UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan in 1997 in his programme for reform entitled Renewing the United 
Nations, which suggested converting the UN Trusteeship Council into a council 
for the global commons. However, the Secretary-General remained rather 
vague regarding the functions of such a trusteeship council, which would at all 
events require an amendment to the UN Charter. An administration in trust by 
the United Nations only appears practicable for areas not subject to national 
sovereignty. However, stronger UN control of the Antarctica is presently 
scarcely enforceable against the resistance of the parties to the Antarctic 
Treaty. A stronger trust function of the United Nations is indeed worth 
considering for the oceans, above all beyond the 200-mile zone, and also for 
outer space. 
2.      International Environmental Court 
An "international environmental court" is also being debated, above all among 
academic lawyers. However, the concept of adjudication by supreme courts 
cannot readily be transferred to global environmental policy. The International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague can albeit rule on all issues of international 
law, and thus also on the interpretation and implementation of international 
environmental agreements. The catch to this is that the court can only rule if 
both parties, the plaintiff and the defendant, agree to put the case before the 
court. This is extremely rarely the case. The ICJ has never yet been called 
upon to interpret environmental agreements and this remains unlikely for the 
future, too, in view of the trend towards non-confrontational approaches to 
15 resolving cases of non-compliance with individual agreements. The 
introduction of binding adjudication for the ICJ or the establishment of an 
international environmental court with binding adjudication currently appears 
similarly improbable. It would seem that no state is yet willing to leave the 
global regulation of greenhouse gas emissions to an independent body of 
experts in international law. 
 
3.      Trade-Restricting Measures 
In principle, environmental policies could be enforced by interventions in 
international trade. The Montreal Protocol provides for restrictions in trade with 
CFCs and with CFC-containing products vis-a-vis non-parties, even with 
products that were only manufactured using CFCs and no longer contain 
these. As the Montreal Protocol was initially almost exclusively negotiated by 
industrialized countries, many developing countries viewed these trade 
restrictions as "eco-colonialism", arguing that the expensive environmental 
standards of the North were being imposed upon the South via the latter's 
integration in international trade. 
A different kind of utilizing the economic North-South gradient for promoting 
environmental policy in developing countries can be found in the campaigns 
mounted by environmental associations in industrialized countries to make 
export financing conditional upon certain environmental standards. In 
Germany, such a campaign has focussed on the government-backed Hermes 
export credit guaranty programme. The aim of the campaign is to prevent 
industrial enterprises of the North that wish to receive an export guaranty from 
applying substantially different standards in developing countries than in 
industrialized countries. However, this may also lead to developing countries 
having to bow to external economic pressure and, at least partly, adapt to the 
environmental policy objectives of the industrialized countries. 
We thus consider this to be a double-edged development. On the one hand a 
"race to the bottom" in environmental standards must be prevented, i.e. 
competition between North and South must not lead to environmental concerns 
falling by the wayside. On the other hand, where environmental issues only 
have a local or regional significance there is no cause for intervening in the 
16 free decision of developing countries on the environmental and development 
policies that they consider to be best for them. As concerns global environ-
mental problems, it is precisely the conventions negotiated internationally by 
mutual agreement - and the World Environment and Development Organization 
proposed here - that should contribute to economically efficient, socially 
acceptable and ecologically effective solutions. The agreements on climate, 
biodiversity and ozone offer a compromise by assuring developing countries 
that when they join they will have a right to lower standards and to 
reimbursement of the incremental costs incurred by their accession. 
V.    PROSPECTIVE OUTLINE OF A WORLD ENVIRONMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION 
1    Decision-Making Procedures 
The modes by which strategies are adopted and conflicts are resolved are 
fundamental to every political institution. While consensus procedures are 
gaining ground in the day-to-day workings of the UN system, it would be a 
mistake to belittle the relevance of the structure of voting rights in its bodies. In 
several international organizations, special tasks and problems have led to the 
establishment of very specific decision-making procedures. Selected elements 
of these various decision-making procedures could be combined in the World 
Environment and Development Organization is order to ensure its effectiveness 
and universal acceptance. 
In particular, care needs to be taken that decision-making gives equal standing 
to the North and the South. This way it is assured that the decisions taken by 
the new World Organization on strategies and programmes are neither in 
conflict with the interests of the developing countries nor with those of the 
industrialized countries. Without consent by the majority of the governments of 
the South, globally effective environmental and development policies are 
inconceivable. Nor can such policies succeed without agreement by the majority 
of the industrialized countries. Decision-making procedures on a basis 
 
   17 of North-South parity are thus in essence a "third path" between the South-
biased procedure of the UN General Assembly (one country, one vote) and the 
North-biased procedure of the Bretton Woods institutions (one dollar, one vote). 
Under the ozone regime (and for the Multilateral Ozone Fund) it was already 
decided in 1990 that every decision requires the approval of two thirds of all 
parties, whereby these two thirds must include a simple majority of the 
developing countries and a simple majority of the industrialized countries. Since 
1994, the decisions of the GEF's Council also require a two-thirds majority, 
which must represent sixty percent of the states participating in the GEF and 
sixty percent of the financial contributions to the Facility. This, too, is essentially 
a procedure on a basis of North-South parity that gives both the developing 
countries and the industrialized countries an effective veto power. 
Both forms of parity procedures could be adopted for the World Environment 
and Development Organization. However, as we will plead below for an 
independent financing of this Organization, a weighting of votes according to 
contributions would scarcely be viable - the ozone regime would then remain as 
a "model" for the Organization. 
One problematic aspect of strict parity procedures is how to agree on which 
countries belong in which group. Singapore, for instance, has a higher per-
capita income than many industrialized countries, but - as a member of the 
"Group of 77" - continues to be classified as a developing country. Under the 
ozone regime, grouping is issue-based: If a developing country consumes more 
than 300 grams of CFCs per capita and year, it is automatically rated as an 
industrialized country, meaning that it must meet the (stricter) reduction 
commitments of the industrialized countries and is assigned to that group for the 
purposes of the parity voting procedure. 
For a World Environment and Development Organization, such an issue-based 
grouping is out of the question. The remaining second best option is the self-
definition of states as applied in UNCTAD and in the UN General Assembly. 
One should at least be able to expect that developing countries which join the 
OECD automatically meet the environmental policy commitments of the 
industrialized countries. 
18 An additional option is to break down the North-South parity procedure into a 
multiple-parity procedure. For instance, four groups could be formed: "Western 
industrialized countries" (with an interim special group of "countries in transition 
to market economies"), "newly industrializing countries", "developing countries" 
and "least developed countries". With four groups, it would remain practicable 
to require the approval of a majority of the members of each of these groups 
for every decision of the World Environment and Development Organization. 
However, a further break-down into groups endowed with veto power would 
diminish the effectiveness of the decision-making process. 
We would like to end with a recommendation: Within a World Environment and 
Development Organization, decision-making procedures on a basis of North-
South parity, such as are already practiced under the ozone regime and in the 
Global Environment Facility, are politically realistic, socially just and 
ecologically sensible. 
The decisions of the bodies of the Organization should therefore require the 
approval of two thirds of all contracting parties, these two thirds including a 
simple majority of the developing countries and a simple majority of the 
industrialized countries. 
2.    Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
In the international negotiations on environmental and development policies, 
the importance of non-state environment and development organizations 
whose work transcends national boundaries has grown substantially. Such 
transnational associations deliver a diverse array of services to the system of 
international institutions: 
•  They perform research and policy advice by qualified staff. 
•  They monitor the mutual commitments of states in a manner impossible to 
government agencies, who are barred from such intervention. 
•  They  inform  governments  and the  public about  both  the  actions  of 
countries' own diplomats and those of the other negotiation partners. 
•  At diplomatic conferences, they give government representatives a direct 
feedback to the domestic situation. 
19 Against this background, more and more voices are calling for giving 
environment and development NGOs an international legal status. An 
important precedent is provided by the decision-making procedure of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), under which each member state is 
represented with four votes, of which two are assigned to government and one 
each to management and labour 
At present, a number of problems attach to the transferral of such a procedure 
to global environmental policy. There are as yet hardly any federations of 
environment and development organizations that convincingly represent their 
entire national clientele. Nonetheless, such coalitions could well emerge in the 
near future. Indeed, this process could be accelerated by enshrining the 
representation of (voting) NGOs from both camps - environment and 
development associations, on the one hand, and industry associations, on the 
other - in the statutes of a World Environment and Development Organization. 
The ILO procedure, we think, would be superior to other proposed concepts -
such as a "world parliament of civil society" parallel to the UN General 
Assembly - because a direct international representation of non-state actors 
could not solve the basic problems of NGOs: 
•  The individual non-state organizations are not comprehensively legitimated 
and may have only a small membership; 
•  environment and development NGOs are not in a position to compete 
adequately with the strong financial clout of business NGOs; 
•  NGOs of low-income developing countries can not compete adequately with 
the financially well-endowed NGOs of industrialized countries. 
Conclusion: The interests of NGOs should be represented in the World 
Environment and Development Organization in a manner modelled on the 
procedure applied in the ILO. In this way, each state could have four votes at 
conferences, two being assigned to government and one each to the national 
representations of environment/development organizations and industry 
associations. 
20 3.    Financing a World Environment and Development Organization 
Various options are available to finance the work of a World Environment and 
Development Organization. Firstly, the industrialized countries have 
recognized since the 1960s the political target of channelling 0.7 percent of 
their gross national product (GNP) to development assistance. Until now, only 
the Scandinavian states and the Netherlands have met the 0.7-percent target, 
some of them even exceeding the 1-percent mark at times. The example of the 
Netherlands shows that industrialized countries can indeed reach that target if 
supported by a corresponding consensus in society. Raising the payments of 
the industrialized countries to this level would therefore be one way to finance 
the work of a World Environment and Development Organization. 
The debt crisis of the developing countries since 1982 has led to various 
proposals aimed at linking the solution to this crisis with the solution of 
environmental and development policy problems. In the middle of the 1980s, 
US-based environmental associations began to buy up debt of developing 
countries on the world market and to "swap" it with the governments concerned in 
exchange for certain environmental policy programmes (debt-for-nature 
swaps), this generally involving the designation of rainforest tracts as protected 
areas. After this first phase, several Northern governments followed suit in the 
late 1980s with similar programmes. 
Where they were carried out by NGOs, debt-for-nature swaps only had 
marginal relevance due to the small volume of capital resources mobilized. 
However, this instrument has not yet been fully utilized by the governments of 
the industrialized countries. A remission of debt linked with environmental 
objectives thus indeed holds considerable promise for the future. In particular, 
industrialized countries could transfer public debt of developing countries to 
the World Environment and Development Organization, or could provide the 
interest from these loans as "knock-on financing" for the Organization. 
It remains a basic problem of all multilateral financial mechanisms that they 
involve no binding, enforceable commitments. Even where there are fixed 
membership contributions - such as to the budget of the United Nations - over 
and again such payments have been politically instrumentalized or have been 
made dependent upon the business cycle. As the theory of collective goods 
21 shows, the financing of common tasks can thus be systematically undermined 
by freeriders. 
Today, states will scarcely subject themselves to direct taxation. It would seem 
more realistic to introduce for the financing of global common tasks automatic 
funding mechanisms in the form of indirect levies that are independent of the 
day-to-day politics of national finance ministers. This recommendation was 
also made in 1995 by the "Independent Working Group on the Future of the 
United Nations", headed by the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Moeen 
Qureshi, and the former President of Germany, Richard von Weizsäcker. In 
the CSD debates, attention has focused on two types of such automatic 
funding mechanisms, both associated with international transactions: a levy on 
international air travel, and a levy on foreign-exchange transactions. 
In the Agenda for Peace, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
proposed a levy on international air travel, mainly to finance peace-keeping 
efforts. A levy of five US dollars on each flown "passenger sector" would 
deliver annual global revenues amounting to about 1.5 billion US dollars. As a 
levy on air travel could easily be raised through airports with low verification 
costs (for instance together with airport charges), its practicability is very high. 
A second promising avenue for financing the World Environment and 
Development Organization is to introduce a levy on international foreign-
exchange transactions. In order to dampen speculative oscillations on the 
burgeoning financial markets and to improve the functioning of the market, the 
later Nobel-laureate James Tobin in the 1970s already proposed placing a 1-
percent tax on currency transactions (this came to be known as the Tobin tax). 
This proposal is currently gaining weight - not only because of the 
"attenuation" of international financial transactions that it offers, but also 
because of the possibility of using revenues for environmental and 
development tasks. Thus, for instance, the late French President Francois 
Mitterrand voiced his support for the Tobin tax at the World Social Summit in 
Copenhagen. It has been estimated that a 0.5-percent tax on worldwide 
financial transactions could raise more than 200 billion US dollars annually. 
These funds could be assigned to the United Nations, its specialized agencies 
and not least to the World Environment and Development Organization under 
discussion here. Although it is conceivable that financial transactions would 
22 shift to states that do not levy the tax, if proper arrangements are made this 
would be associated with costs that could exceed those of the tax. 
We would like to end with the recommendation that financing the work of the 
World Environment and Development Organization should be organized 
•  by raising the public North-South transfer to at least 0.7 percent of GNP; 
•  by assigning the debt instruments of the developing countries or the returns 
from such loans as knock-on financing for the Organization; and 
•  by supporting automatic international funding mechanisms,  particularly 
levies on international air travel or on financial transactions. 
V.    CONCLUSIONS 
While improved efficiency and more coordination are desirable, they will not 
suffice on their own to upgrade the efficacy of the existing system of 
international institutions in global environmental and development policy. This 
system therefore needs to be complemented by a further specialized agency of 
the United Nations: a World Environment and Development Organization that 
integrates existing programmes and institutions. This could, firstly, serve to 
give an enhanced status to the urgent tasks of global environmental and 
development policy among national governments, international organizations, 
NGOs and civil society at large. Secondly, it could help to improve the 
institutional setting for the negotiation of new conventions and programmes of 
action and for the implementation and coordination of existing ones. Thirdly, 
this would be a way to strengthen the capacity for action of states, particularly 
in Africa, Asia and Latin America, through improved international cooperation 
and support. 
As regards decision-making procedures within the new Organization, the 
greatest possible acceptance for the Organization could be achieved through 
procedures on a basis of North-South parity modelled on the ozone regime. 
Here both the majority of the developing countries and the majority of the 
industrialized countries could each have a group veto power over the 
decisions. In addition, representatives of environment and development 
 
    23 associations on the one side and industry associations on the other should 
have voting rights according to the tripartite system of the ILO, i.e. each 
country could have four votes: two for government and one each for the group 
of environment/development associations and the group of industry 
associations. 
Financing, too, appears practicable. For one thing, considerable costs would 
be saved by integrating the existing programmes and convention secretariats. 
In addition, funding can be provided by meeting the 0.7-percent GNP target of 
the industrialized countries, by assigning debt instruments of the developing 
countries to the purposes of the World Environment and Development 
Organization, and by introducing automatic funding mechanisms, notably a 
levy on international air travel or on international financial transactions. 
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